The world economy has for some time been characterised by a growing generalised trend towards regionalism. This is often considered to be on a par with the formation of blocs, fragmentation of the trading system and a relapse into the disastrous conditions of the thirties. However, if regionalism is understood not as a defensive or aggressive policy of bloc .building, as in the thirties, but as a regional grouping that is open towards the world economy, it appears to have something to offer as an alternative to the old international economic order.
A fter the second world war there were two determined attempts to establish a universal international economic order to solve the economic problems of the "one world" and consciously to replace "naturally developed" economic relations by "legally created" international economic orders via international fora. Both the old international economic order "organised ''t and applied from 1945 onwards through international organisations such as the IMF, the World Bank and GATT and the blueprint for a new international economic order drawn up by the United Nations from 1973 onwards but never put into effect could have been regarded as genuinely universal systems. Instead, however, the world economy divided into three parts. For a variety of reasons, the countries of the second world, the socialist state-trading countries of the Eastern bloc, did not fit into either the old or the new international economic order. The other two subsystems also reflected too closely the interests of the old industrialised countries (the first world) and the new developing countries (the third world). Both the East-West conflict and the North-South divide stood in the way of a world economic order.
Remarkably, these obstacles to a universal system, which were the result of political and economic disparities, have recently become much less important as development and reforms proceeded, especially in China and the USSR but also in other countries, such as the newly industrialising countries (NICs). Instead, the world economy has been dominated for some time by interesting new "cross linkages" of quite another kind. The best known of these stem from the shift of both economic activities and world economic policy from the * Free University, Berlin (West).
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Atlantic basin to the Pacific. Another factor is the "splitting" of the Atlantic region into a North American area and a new European economic area (EC 1992) , with the increasing orientation of the USA towards the Pacific Rim bringing the situation into even sharper fOCUS. 2 On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that certain regions, such as Africa and South America, are in danger of being marginalised by this trend towards regionaleconomic groupings. 3
Collapse of the Old Economic Order
Before examining this trend towards regionalism, however, let us consider a number of points that throw light on the "collapse" of the old international economic order. Before the recent heated debate about US free trade areas or the EC internal market, discussion was already centred on two other issues that are also important elements in regionalism, namely deregulation and international co-operation. These two slogans took on special meaning against the unstable background of a "naturally developed" international economic order after the old "legally created" system was virtually abandoned at almost the same time as unsuccessful attempts were being made to create a new one. Whereas the advent of a "non-system" was acknowledged at an early stage as far as the monetary 1 The pair of terms "legally created" ("gesetzte") and "naturally developed" ("gewachsene") order stem from Walter E u c k e n : Die Grundlagen der NationalSkonomie, T0bingen 1950. The term "organised international economic order" was coined by Hans M 6 II e r : InternationaleWirtschaftsorganisationen,Wiesbaden 1960.
2 For an interesting variation, see the GATT Report of 1984/85, pp. 13 ft.
3 Further details in D. L o re n z: Notes on NICs and Regional Developments in the World Economy-A European View, Free University Berlin (mimeo, September 1988 system was concerned (Williamson, Cooper), the same is now being predicted increasingly often in the eighties with regard to the GATT. For several years we have had to contend with an unbalanced mix of managed trade and laissez faJre in both trade and monetary affairs. 4
A prominent feature of this unstable mixed "system" is the coexistence of almost completely deregulated markets in goods, finance and foreign exchange alongside a diverse variety of arrangements that are on the very bounds of legality as propounded by the old economic order, such as the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), voluntary export restraint agreements (VERs), partial exchange controls and dirty floating. Even the international organisations of which the old economic order was composed were unable to keep the world economy functioning on a multilateral level. They were almost always under the influence of special circumstances. In the fifties and sixties, the golden decades of re-integration, they were either more or less quiescent, as with the Marshall Plan, or conditions were such that they did not have to act. In later years they were often bypassed in favour of reserve currencies, flexible exchange rates, Euro~ markets or protectionist "regimes". Moreover, the universalist hegemony under the Pax Americana weakened considerably, giving way mainly to "trilateral clubs" that the core countries created in the shape of a variety of socalled "G-units" (Group ofTen, Five etc.) or "GATT-Plus" approaches.
Deregulation and Co-operation
As far as deregulation and co-operation are concerned, two remarkable sequences can be discerned for both trade and monetary affairs over the period since the war. In the area of trade the old tariff barriers were successfully removed, only to be replaced by non-tariff neo-protectionism. One of the main reasons for this was the negligent failure to develop a "positive" concept for macro-economic adjustment and competition policy by means of international cooperation. Given the unprecedented need for 4 Compare for instance J. P e I k m a n s : adjustment as a result of structural change and competition for market shares owing to the new (substitutive) international division of labour, deregulation alone with very restrictive provision for exemptions (as under Article 19 of the GATT) could no longer succeed after world economic growth had returned to normal levels. As a consequence, ever more neo-mercantilistic regimes emerged. 5
In the monetary field, the necessary international cooperation was not even practised during the time of the Bretton Woods System. Instead, there was a permissive creation of liquidity to finance balance-of-payments and exchange-rate disequilibria. Nor was international cooperation fostered by the partial deregulation of credit and foreign exchange markets that began in the sixties or the fully-fledged "double" deregulation via huge Euro-currency markets and the floating of currencies in the seventies. To some extent they had the opposite objective, namely to protect independent national economic policies from external influences, both in the North and in the South. Moreover, economies became more vulnerable to unco-ordinated national macroeconomic or stabitisation policies and to monetary protectionism. Last but not least, currency deregulation proved questionable in the very field for which it was regarded as particularly helpful, namely overcoming the macro-economic oil shocks. The well-intentioned efforts of industrial and developing countries alike to tackle macro-economic shocks via the deregulated private capital markets (recycling) subsequently necessitated international ad hoc co-operation on a large scale. The international interest rate links via deregulated markets had a particularly adverse effect owing to the global and almost total interdependence created in this field. This led to a specific requirement to manage the debt crisis and a great need for international co-operation in a context of heightened risks to the world system of finance and trade.
Given this sequence of events in the monetary and trade fields, it is not surprising that world economic policy in the eighties found itself confronted increasingly with demands for both deregulation and co-operationon the one hand the deregulation of international trade to eliminate mercantilistic regimes and on the other greater co-operation in macro-economic and monetary policy to stabilise exchange rates or reduce excessive balance-of-payments disequilibria. Assessments of the extent to which these two demands could be met differ widely; there is greater optimism about the progress towards deregulation than towards co-operation, since the one implies only a "negative" policy but the other a "positive" policy as well. 6
